By a classifying topos for a rst-order theory T, we mean a topos E such that, for any topos F, models of Tin F correspond exactly to open geometric morphisms F ! E. We show that not every (in nitary) rst-order theory has a classifying topos in this sense, but we characterize those which do by an appropriate`smallness condition', and we show that every Grothendieck topos arises as the classifying topos of such a theory. We also show that every rst-order theory has a conservative extension to one which possesses a classifying topos, and we obtain a Heyting-valued completeness theorem for in nitary rst-order logic.
are`too well-behaved': their inverse image functors preserve the interpretations, not only of nitary rst-order formulae, but of arbitrary (L 1! ) in nitary ones as well. And there are simply too many of the latter, even if we restrict ourselves to propositional logic. It is well known ( 6] , 7], 20]) that the free complete Boolean algebra on a countable in nity of generators is a proper class; perhaps less familiar is the fact 11] that the corresponding problem for complete Heyting algebras occurs already with two generators|that is, there is a proper class of L 1! formulae in two propositional variables, no two of which are (constructively) provably equivalent. The model-theoretic version of this fact says that, for any cardinal , we can build a complete Heyting algebra H of cardinality at least which is generated by two elements. Now let T be the empty theory in a language L with two primitive propositional symbols: we can regard the generators of H as a model of T in the topos Sh(H ) of sheaves on H . If the classifying topos B fo (T) existed, this model would be classi ed by an open geometric morphism f : Sh(H ) ! B fo (T); since f preserves the interpretations of arbitrary rst-order formulae, we see that it must be surjective on subobjects of 1, and hence (since this holds for all ) that the lattice of subobjects of 1 in B fo (T) must be a proper class|which is impossible.
However, we shall show in this paper that the above`cardinality problem' is the only obstruction to the existence of B fo (T). Speci cally, we shall prove that, for an arbitrary T, there exists a topos B fo (T) with the universal property described above if and only if, for every nite stringx of variables in the language of T, the complete Heyting algebra of T-provable-equivalence classes of formulae with free variables inx is a set. Moreover, for any T and any cardinal such that T may be axiomatized by formulae in L ! , there exists a canonical extension of T to a theory T with the above smallness property, which is L ! -conservative (i.e. every L ! sentence derivable from T is derivable from T). In particular, the generic T-model in B fo (T) is an L ! -conservative model of T. Also, every Grothendieck topos E occurs, up to equivalence, as B fo (T) for some T; thus we may, once again, identify Grothendieck toposes with Morita-equivalence classes of`provably small' rst-order theories.
The main ingredient in the proofs of the above statements is a characterization of the open geometric morphisms into a Grothendieck topos E = Sh(C;J) in terms of the at and continuous functors on C which induce them. We prove this result in section 1 of the paper. Sections 2 and 3 are devoted to reviewing material from categorical logic, culminating in the`Heyting-valued completeness theorem' for (intuitionistic) in nitary rstorder logic. In section 4, we show how to construct the rst-order theory classi ed by a given topos E ; in particular, if E is given as the classifying topos B g (T) of a geometric theory T, we show that its rst-order theory may be taken to consist of all sentences satis ed in the generic model of T. In section 5 we prove our main theorem characterizing those rst-order theories which admit classifying toposes. Finally, section 6 is devoted to the discussion of some examples and applications.
Throughout the paper, for simplicity, we shall work in the 2-category of Grothendieck toposes (that is, toposes de ned and bounded over the classical topos of sets Set); the word`topos', unless otherwise stated, will meaǹ Grothendieck topos'. However, those readers who are accustomed to working over a base topos S will have little di culty in extending our results to the latter more general context (for any topos S with a natural number object); of course, the cardinality bounds which we use have to be replaced by bounds expressed in terms of subobjects of a suitable object of S . 1 Open maps into sheaf toposes Let E be the topos of sheaves on a (small) site (C; J). Diaconescu's theorem 3] asserts that, for any topos F , there is an equivalence between the category Top (F; E ) of geometric morphisms from F to E , and the category of at and continuous functors C ! F (see also 15] , section VII.7 or 8], proposition 7.13). Our aim in this section is to characterize those functors C ! F which correspond to open geometric morphisms, in the sense of 9] or 12].
Although, for most of this paper, our working de nition of open maps will be that they are precisely those geometric morphisms f : F ! E whose inverse image functors preserve full (in nitary) rst-order logic, in the present section it will be convenient to use the characterization of them in terms of the map : E ! f F which is the transpose of the characteristic function of the monomorphism f (> E ). We recall that f is open i has an internal left adjoint : f F ! E (see 9], theorem 3.2 or 12], p. 56). Now suppose that E = Sh(C;J), and that the geometric morphism f corresponds to a at continuous functor F : C ! F . Let ": C ! E denote the composite of the Yoneda embedding C ! C op ; Set] with the associated sheaf functor. Then we may identify E with the sheaf which to an object A of C assigns the set of subobjects of "(A) in E , or equivalently the set of J-closed sieves on A in C (recall that a sieve S is J-closed if, whenever we have a morphism : B ! A and a J-covering sieve R on B such that 2 S for all 2 R, then 2 S). Similarly, we may identify f ( F ) with the sheaf whose value at A is the set of subobjects of f "(A) = F(A). In terms of these identi cations, the map may be identi ed with the action of f on subobjects of "(A); that is, A (S "(A)) = (f S F(A)). Note also that the action of a morphism : A ! B of C on both E and f F is given by pullback of subobjects; since f preserves pullbacks, it is clear that the Here, as usual, 8 F( ) and 8 "( ) denote the right adjoints of F( ) and "( ) acting on subobjects. We note that, in both conditions, the equality sign could be replaced by an inclusion ( ) of subobjects, since the reverse inclusion is automatic for any f. Proof Since Sub("(A)) and Sub(F(A)) are complete lattices, the rst condition of the lemma is equivalent to saying that each A has a left adjoint A : E (A) ! f F (A). Given the existence of these left adjoints, the second condition is equivalent to the commutativity of the diagram of left adjoints
A -Sub("(A)) ?
"( ) for every : A ! B in C , i.e. to saying that the A form a morphism of sheaves : E ! f F . So the two conditions together are equivalent to saying that has an internal left adjoint in E , i.e. that f is open.
We remark that Lemma 1.1 could also be deduced by combining 16], lemma 6.1.8, with 9], theorem 3.2(v).
Using the description of E (A) as the set of closed sieves on A, we get the following translation of Lemma 1.1, which we state for future reference: (1) and (ii) for each : A ! B in C and each closed sieve S on A, 2 8 Sg : (2) Here 8 S denotes the closed sieve f : D ! B j (8 : D ! A)(( = ) ) ( 2 S))g :
The map 8 : E (A) ! E (B) is the right adjoint of the action of on closed sieves.
We conclude this section with some more remarks about preservation of logical connectives. If fu i : E i ! E j i 2 Ig is an epimorphic family of maps in E , we have an embedding of complete Heyting algebras
Sub(E i ) :
Applying this to the epimorphic family fe : "(A) ! E j e 2 E(A); A 2 ob C g where E is any object of E = Sh(C;J), and to the image of this family under f for some geometric morphism f : F ! E , we obtain a commutative square of complete Heyting algebras
where F : C ! F is the at continuous functor corresponding to f, and the vertical maps are induced by the action of f on subobjects. 
is the subobject f S 1 , f S 2 of F(A) Proof Since S 1 , S 2 = f j S 1 = S 2 g, the condition says that f preserves , on the level of the site. But this is equivalent to saying that f preserves implication, because in any Heyting algebra (h ) h 0 ) (h , (h^h 0 )).
First-order theories and syntactic categories
In this section we brie y recall the fundamentals of rst-order categorical model theory; for more details we refer the reader to 16], 15], chapter X or 5], appendix B. We shall work over a (possibly) many-sorted signature speci ed by giving a set of base sorts (denoted A; B; C; : : :), a set of primitive functionsymbols f; g; h; : : : and a set of primitive relation-symbols R; S; T; : : :; the latter will always include an equality predicate = A for each sort A. Each function-or relation-symbol has a speci ed type which is a nite string of sorts; we write f :Ã ! B or R Ã to indicate the type of a primitive symbol. We identify constants of sort A with nullary function-symbols ] ! A (where ] denotes the empty string of sorts), and primitive propositions with nullary relation-symbols R ]. A -structure M in a category C with (at least) nite products assigns to each sort A an object MA, to each function-symbol f :Ã ! B a morphism Mf : MÃ ! MB (where MÃ denotes the product MA 1 MA n , ifÃ = (A 1 ; : : : ; A n )), and to each relation-symbol R Ã a subobject MR MÃ (with the proviso that M(= A ) is necessarily the diagonal subobject of MA MA).
Our formal language is the in nitary language L ! ( ) (which we shall abbreviate to L when there is no danger of confusion): that is, we allow the formation of in nite conjunctions V i2I i and disjunctions W j2J j of formulae provided (a) the cardinalities of the index sets I and J are less than , and (b) the total number of free variables in any formula remains nite. (Note that we always allow the empty conjunction > and the empty disjunction ?.) Here denotes an in nite regular cardinal (as it will throughout this paper); we allow the possibility that = 1, the`cardinality of the universe' (i.e. that we place no restrictions on the size of conjunctions and disjunctions). However, the restriction to nitely many free variables will remain in force throughout. By a context, we mean a nite stringx of distinct variables; we shall write (x) to indicate thatx is a suitable context for the formula , i.e. that all the free variables of appear in it (though it may contain variables which do not appear in ). The type of a contextx is the stringÃ of (not necessarily distinct!) sorts of the variables inx. By a rst-order theory Tover , we mean (informally) a set of sentences in L 1! ( ); however, we shall identify two theories T and T 0 if each member of the rst set is deducible from the second, and vice versa. (Here it should be emphasized that our notion of deducibility is relative to an intuitionistic deduction-system such as that in 2]|suitably extended to handle the innitary connectives, cf. 18] or 13]|since we wish to study models of our theories in categories (such as non-Boolean toposes) where the rules of classical logic are not valid.) One might therefore be tempted to identify each theory with its deductive closure (i.e. the class of all sentences deducible from it); however, it is important for our purposes that the axioms of a theory form a set rather than a proper class. (Note that this implies, in particular, that for each theory T we can nd a cardinal such that T is actually contained in L ! ( ).)
We recall that a formula is said to be -geometric if it can be built up from atomic formulae by means of nite conjunctions, disjunctions of cardinality less than , and existential quanti cations. (If = 1, we simply say is geometric; if = !, we say is coherent. A ( -)geometric axiom is a sentence of the form (8x)( ) ) where and are ( -)geometric formulae andx is a suitable context for them; a ( -)geometric theory is one speci ed by a set T of ( -)geometric axioms.
In order to interpret compound formulae in a -structure M, we need to impose further restrictions on the category C in which M lives. We recall that a regular category is one with nite limits and (regular epi/mono) factorizations, the latter being stable under pullback; by a -geometric category we mean a regular category having unions for arbitrary families of subobjects of cardinality less than , the unions being additionally stable under pullback. (Makkai and Reyes 16] call these -logical categories, and (in the case = !) Freyd and Scedrov 5] call them pre-logoi.) By a -Heyting category, we mean a regular category C having unions and intersections for families of subobjects of cardinality less than , and such that the operation of pulling back subobjects of B along a xed morphism f : A ! B of C has a right adjoint 8 f (it follows that the unions, as well as the intersections, are automatically stable under pullback; it is also easy to show that in such a category we automatically have an implication operation making each subobject lattice into a Heyting algebra, and that implication is also stable under pullback). Again, this concept has been given di erent names elsewhere in the literature; in particular, Freyd and Scedrov 5] call it a logos in the case = !. It is well known that any (Grothendieck) topos is an 1-Heyting category.
It is clear that, given a -structure M in a -geometric (resp. -Heyting) category C , we may proceed to interpret any -geometric (resp. arbitrary L ) formula-in-context (x) over as a subobject (x)] M of MA 1 MA n , whereÃ = (A 1 ; : : :; A n ) is the type ofx. Moreover, this interpretation is sound for the logical calculus mentioned above, in the sense that if a sentence is deducible from a theory T, then it is satis ed in all T-models in appropriate categories. (As usual, we say that is satis ed in a structure each formula-in-context (x) we shall have a diagram (x)] M (x)] N MÃ ?
? fÃ -NÃ ?
? (4) where fÃ is the product of the f A i . The usual de nition of a (homo)morphism of -structures is equivalent to saying that we have (x)] M f Ã (x)] N (i.e.
that the above diagram can be completed to a commutative square) for all atomic formulae ; an easy induction then shows that the same condition holds for all geometric formulae , but it is well known that the induction breaks down for formulae involving implication or universal quanti cation. A stronger condition, commonly known by the name embedding ofstructures, is to demand an equality (x)] M = f Ã (x)] N for all atomic , i.e. to demand that the diagram (4) should be completable to a pullback square. Given that our language always includes the predicate = A whose interpretation in any M is the diagonal subobject of MA MA, this condition clearly forces each f A to be monic. Once again, it is easy to show that this condition is inherited by all quanti er-free formulae , but it may fail for formulae involving quanti ers.
Classically, a morphism f is called an elementary embedding if the diagram (4) is completable to a pullback square for all L ! formulae-in-context (x); it seems reasonable to use the term -elementary embedding if (4) is a pullback for all L formulae-in-context. (We shall give an example below to demonstrate the dependence of this concept on .) However, the fourth corner of the parallelogram, namely the condition that (4) should commute for all (L ) formulae, is not commonly considered by classical model-theorists. Of course, the reason is that, if we restrict our attention to structures in a Boolean topos such as Set, then the commutativity of (4) for the complementary subobjects (x)] and : (x)] forces both the squares to be pullbacks; but this is far from being the case in a non-Boolean topos (again, we shall give an example below), and it turns out that this fourth condition is the one of greatest importance for us.
Morphisms satisfying this condition seem to have been rst explicitly considered (in the case = !) in 17], where they were called`weak elementary embeddings'; but this name seems unsatisfactory since such morphisms do not have to be monic. Accordingly, we introduce the name -elementary morphism of -structures for a family of morphisms f A such that we have (x)] M f Ã (x)] N for all L formulae-in-context (x) over . We write -Str(C) for the category of all -structures in C and -elementary morphisms between them; and, if T is a theory in L , we write T-Mod(C) for the full subcategory of -Str(C) whose objects are T-models. (Note that the subscripts cannot be omitted even in the case = !; we use the unsubscripted notations for the categories whose morphisms are arbitrary homomorphisms of -structures.) Example 2.1 Let E be the Sierpi nski topos whose objects are diagrams A = (A(0) ! A(1)) in Set and whose morphisms are commutative squares.
Let be the one-sorted signature whose only primitive symbol is equality (so that -structures are simply objects). Let N be the terminal object of E , and let M be any object such that M(1) is a singleton. An easy induction shows that the interpretation in N of any L 1 formula-in-context over is either the whole of N n = 1 or its zero subobject (that is, the intermediate subobject (0 ! 1) cannot occur); so, in order to prove that the unique morphism M ! N is 1-elementary, it su ces to show that whenever (x)] N = 0 we also have (x)] M = 0. But if (x)] N = 0, then since the functor`evaluate at 1' is the inverse image of an open geometric morphism Set ! E we see that the interpretation of (x) in the terminal object of Set is also 0, and hence also (x)] M (1) = 0. And this forces (x)] M (0) = 0; thus we have shown that M ! N is an 1-elementary morphism. But it is clearly not an embedding if M(0) has more than one element. Example 2.2 To show the dependence of -elementarity on the cardinal , it su ces to consider models in Set. Let be the single-sorted signature with a countable in nity of constant symbols c i (i 2 !); let M be the set of natural numbers with c i interpreted as i for each i, and let N be any uncountable set with each c i interpreted as a di erent element of N. It is easy to see that the obvious embedding of -structures M ! N is !-elementary, since M and N have isomorphic ultrapowers (indeed, for a suitable choice of its cardinality, N is isomorphic to an ultrapower of M); but it is not ! 1 -elementary since the L ! 1 sentence (8x) W i2! (x = c i ) is satis ed in M but not in N.
We next recall brie y the construction of the syntactic category Syn g (T) of a geometric theory T: for a detailed exposition, see 16], chapter 8 or 15], chapter X. The objects of Syn g (T) are equivalence classes (x)] of geometric formulae-in-context in the language of T, where the equivalence relation identi es (x) with (ỹ) if the contextsx andỹ have the same type, and is obtained from by substituting y i for x i , for each i. In de ning morphisms (x)] ! (ỹ)] in Syn g (T), we may therefore assume (and it is convenient to do so) that the contextsx andỹ have no variables in common; such a morphism is then de ned to be a T-provable-equivalence class of geometric formulae in the concatenated contextx;ỹ which are`Tprovably functional from to ', in the sense that the appropriate geometric axioms are derivable in T. The composite of two morphisms
is de ned to be the provable-equivalence class of the formula (9ỹ)( ^ ). The veri cation that Syn g (T) is a (geometric) category is tedious but straightforward. Moreover, it contains a structure U T for the signature of Tobtained by setting U T If the theory Tis -geometric (for some < 1), then we may restrict ourselves to -geometric formulae in de ning the objects and morphisms of the syntactic category, and thus obtain a (small) -geometric category Syn g (T)
with the corresponding universal property. However, there is no real need to do so. Although Syn g (T) is a large category, there is a canonical form theorem for geometric formulae which says that every such formula is provably equivalent to one of the form W i2I i where the i are regular formulae (that is, constructed using only nite conjunction and existential quanti cation): since we may clearly omit duplicate copies of the same formula from any such disjunction, it follows that we have, up to provable equivalence, only a set of distinct geometric formulae in any context. Since T-provably equivalent formulae-in-context de ne isomorphic objects of Syn g (T), it follows that the latter is (not only locally small but) essentially small, i.e. equivalent to a small category|indeed, it is equivalent to Syn g (T) for su ciently large .
When working with full rst-order logic, we do not have any such canonical form theorem (indeed, as we noted in the Introduction, it is possible to generate a proper class of inequivalent propositional formulae from just two primitive proposition symbols), and so we shall have to be more careful about the size of the formulae which we admit in the construction of our syntactic category. Nevertheless, the purely formal parts of the construction go through without any essential change. If T is a theory in L (for some 1), we de ne the syntactic category Syn fo (T), exactly as in the geometric case, but admitting arbitrary formulae of L in the de nition of both the objects and the morphisms of the category. Just as before, we may verify For a detailed proof of 2.4 in the case = !, see 5], B.314. Note, incidentally, the change in the codomain of the displayed functor of 2.4 as compared with 2.3: we are required to cut down to the -elementary morphisms between T-models, in order to ensure that such morphisms correspond to natural transformations between functors de ned on the syntactic category.
Syntactic sites and the completeness theorem
If C is a small -geometric category (for example, the syntactic category of a -geometric theory), we may equip it with the -covering Grothendieck topology J : a sieve R on an object A of C belongs to J i it contains a family of maps ( i : B i ! A j i 2 I) of cardinality less than , such that the union of the images of the i is the whole of A. By ( 16] , proposition 3.3.3) or ( 15] , lemma X.5.4), we know that this topology is subcanonical (that is, all the representable functors C op ! Set are sheaves): moreover, a functor F : C ! E (where E is a topos) is at and J -continuous i it preserves nite limits, images and unions of families of subobjects of cardinality less than |that is, i it is a -geometric functor. Thus, on combining 2.3 with Diaconescu's theorem, we immediately obtain the standard proof of the existence of classifying toposes for -geometric theories: given such a theory T, we may take B g (T) to be the topos Sh(Syn g (T); J ). Note also that, since the Yoneda embedding y: Syn g (T) ! B g (T) is full and faithful, the generic T-model G T = y(U T ) satis es only those geometric sentences which are satis ed in U T (equivalently, derivable from T).
In passing, we remark that the choice of the cardinal is not crucial, provided it is large enough for all the axioms of T to be expressible in L . The canonical form theorem for geometric formulae, mentioned in the last section, ensures that if < then every object of Syn g (T) is the union of a family of subobjects of cardinality less than , all of which lie in Syn g (T).
Hence it is easy to verify that the inclusion (Syn g (T);J ) -(Syn g (T); J ) satis es the hypotheses of the Grothendieck Comparison Lemma (cf. 15], p. 588) and so gives rise to an equivalence of sheaf toposes. Once again, the corresponding result is very far from being true when we replace thè geometric' versions of the syntactic categories by the`full rst-order' ones.
The key result of this section is the following lemma which, although it has a claim to be considered`folklore', appears never to have been noticed in print before. i.e. that every morphism in R factors through B 0 B. Let g: C ! B be such a morphism, and let h: D ! A be its pullback along f; then h 2 f (R), and so h factors through A 0 A; that is, the image A 00 A of h satis es A 00 A 0 . Since image factorizations in C are stable under pullback, it follows that the image B 00 B of g satis es B 00 B 0 ; so we have our required factorization.
The above proof may be compared with that of the result (which is undoubtedly`folklore') that the Yoneda embedding of a small cartesian closed category preserves exponentials. Indeed, in the particular case when C is locally cartesian closed as well as a Heyting category, it follows from the latter, since the functors 8 f are simply the restrictions of the functors f (the right adjoints to pullback between slice categories) to subobjects. However, the signi cance of 3.1 itself is contained in the following two immediate corollaries. Corollary 3.2 If C is a small -Heyting category and J denotes thecovering topology on C , then the Yoneda embedding C ! Sh(C;J ) is a -Heyting functor.
Proof We have already observed that y is a -geometric functor (i.e. that it preserves nite intersections, unions of cardinality less than , and images). By the Lemma, it preserves universal quanti cation (and hence also implication in the subobject lattices); and it clearly preserves all intersections of subobjects which exist in C . Corollary 3.3 (Completeness theorem for L ! ) Let T be an arbitrary theory in L ! ( ). Then there exists a Grothendieck topos containing a conservative model of T, i.e. one satisfying only those sentences of L ! ( ) which are derivable from T; moreover, this topos may be taken to be localic over Set.
In particular, any sentence of L ! ( ) which is satis ed in all T-models in localic toposes is derivable from T. Proof Apply 3.2 to the syntactic category Syn fo (T). We have seen that the universal model of T in this category is conservative, and since the Yoneda embedding is full and faithful it re ects isomorphisms; so y(U T ) is also a conservative model of T. To obtain such a model in a localic topos, we combine this observation with the result ( 12], p. 59; 9], Proposition 4.4) that for any Grothendieck topos E there exists an open surjection F ! E with F localic.
Since the completeness theorem holds for all < 1, it follows easily that its weak form holds for = 1 as well: that is, Corollary 3.4 If Tis a rst-order theory and is any L 1 sentence satis ed in all models of T in localic toposes, then is derivable from T.
Proof Given T and , we can clearly choose such that T f g L . So the result follows from 3.3.
On the other hand, the strong form of the theorem (the existence of a single T-model which is L -conservative) clearly fails for = 1; for if T is the empty theory over a signature with two primitive proposition symbols, then the result of 11] mentioned in the Introduction implies that a topos containing an L 1 -conservative model of Twould have to have a proper class of subobjects of 1.
In the case = !, 3.3 was proved by P. Freyd, around 1975 ; his proof may be found in 5] under the name`Stone representation theorem for logoi' (and see also 4], theorem 5.22, where the theorem is stated in terms of models in categories of Heyting-valued sets). However, Freyd's proof (which admittedly yields a more precise result) is much less direct than the above. The observation that y(U T ) yields a conservative model of T was made independently by E. Palmgren 19] and the rst author.
We note also that y(U T ) is a minimal model of Tin the sense of Moerdijk T ) ). However, it is not the case in general that every T-model in F can be`classi ed' in this way by an open geometric morphism. Nor is it the case that an arbitrary geometric morphism f into Sh(Syn fo (T)) is determined up to isomorphism by the -structure f y(U T ) (recall that a -structure, according to our de nition, consists of the objects and morphisms interpreting the primitive symbols of our language), even when the latter is a model of T. We shall investigate this problem further in 4.4{4.6 below.
The rst-order theory of a topos
Let E = Sh(C;J) be a topos; for convenience, we shall assume in this section that the category C (is small and) has nite limits, so that at functors on C are just nite-limit-preserving ones. The standard proof that E occurs as a geometric classifying topos B g (T) takes Tto be the theory of at continuous functors on (C; J), which we may present as follows. The sorts of our signature are the objects of C , and each morphism f : A ! B of C is regarded as a unary function-symbol of ; there are no primitive predicate symbols except equality. The axioms of Tfall into three groups: the rst group, consisting of all sentences (8x)(1 A (x) = x) where 1 A is an identity morphism of C , and (8x)(f(g(x)) = h(x)) whenever fg = h in C , ensures that T-models in a category F are in particular functors C ! F . Then we have a group of axioms to ensure that the functors preserve nite limits: speci cally, we take the sentences (9x)> and (8x; y)(x = y) where x and y are variables of sort 1 (the terminal object of C ), and for each pullback square P p -A B q ? g -C ?
f in C we take the axioms (8x; y)((f(x) = g(y)))(9z)((p(z) = x)^(q(z) = y))) and (8z; z 0 )(((p(z) = p(z 0 ))^(q(z) = q(z 0 ))) ) (z = z 0 )), where the sorts of the variables x; y; z are A; B; P respectively. Finally, to ensure that models correspond to continuous (i.e. cover-preserving) functors, we adopt the axiom 
where f j : B j ! A j j 2 J i g is a family of morphisms generating the closed sieve S i , and f k : B k ! A j k 2 Kg similarly generates T i2I S i . And (2) becomes (8y) (8x) ( (x) = y)) _ i2I (9z i )( i (z i ) = x) , _ j2J (9w j )( j (w j ) = y) (7) where f i : C i ! A j i 2 Ig and f j : D j ! B j j 2 Jg are generating families for S and 8 S respectively. (As we observed after the statement of 1.1, the bi-implications which appear in these two sentences could be replaced by unidirectional implications ()), since the reverse implications are automatic.)
We have thus established: Note that, on the right-hand side of the above equivalence, we have the category whose morphisms are arbitrary homomorphisms between Tmodels, and not just the elementary morphisms: this is because by de nition Open(F;E) is a full subcategory of Top(F;E), and we know that morphisms in the latter correspond to arbitrary homomorphisms of -structures. However, we shall see in a moment that it is at least possible to choose T in such a way that every homomorphism of T-models is 1-elementary. To do this, we consider the case when E is given as the (geometric) classifying topos of a geometric theory T, i.e. when (C; J) has the form (Syn g (T); J ).
In this case, it would clearly be advantageous to express the rst-order theory (T, say) corresponding to E over the same signature as T, instead of passing to the larger signature required to describe functors on the syntactic category. In particular, we should hope that by taking T to consist of all rst-order sentences which are satis ed in the generic model G T , we might obtain a theory adequate to characterize the open geometric morphisms into E . (Of course, this T is a proper class, and therefore not a theory as we de ned it in section 2. However, it is clearly su cient to choose a cardinal which strictly exceeds the sizes of all the subobject lattices Sub(G T (Ã)), forÃ a nite string of sorts of , and then to take T to consist of all the L sentences satis ed by G T . Note that may well be strictly larger than the cardinal required to express T as a theory in L .) Lemma 4.2 For the rst-order theory T just described, every rst-order formula-in-context is provably equivalent to a geometric formula-in-context; that is, given any formula-in-context (x), we can nd a geometric formula in the same context such that (8x)( , ) is derivable in T.
Proof The interpretation of (x) in the generic T-model G T will be some subobject of G T (Ã), whereÃ is the type ofx; but every such subobject also occurs as the interpretation of some geometric (indeed, -geometric, where is as above) formula-in-context (x). So the sentence in the statement of the lemma is satis ed in G T , and hence derivable in T.
We shall call a theory geometrically saturated if it has the property described in the statement of Lemma 4.2. We note that, if T is geometrically saturated, then any homomorphism of T-models is automatically 1elementary, since we already observed that (4) is always completable to a commutative square for geometric formulae. (However, it seems unlikely that this property characterizes geometrically saturated theories, since it also holds when every formula-in-context is provably equivalent to a positiveexistential formula|that is, one constructed using in nitary conjunction as well as the`geometric' connectives.) Proof The equality T-Mod(F) = T-Mod(F) 1 follows from the fact that T is geometrically saturated, as we observed after 4.2. The equivalence with Open(F;B g (T)) follows from the fact that, since every object and morphism of Syn g (T) is (the interpretation in G T of) a formula-in-context of L, we can rewrite the conditions (6) and (7) as rst-order sentences in this language. (The other rst-order sentences above, which we used to axiomatize the theory of at continuous functors on a site, can be similarly rewritten; but there is no need to do so, since they translate into sentences which are derivable from T.) For example, if : B ! A is the morphism We note that, in addition to being geometrically saturated, the theory T of 4.3 is a geometrically conservative extension of T|that is, any geometric axiom derivable from T is already derivable from T|since G T is a (geometrically) conservative model of T. We shall see in 5.4 below that these two properties su ce to characterize T amongst extensions of T; and in 6.4 we shall give an example of how an explicit description of the classifying topos B g (T) may be used to give an explicit axiomatization of the theory T.
We also note that the two properties`geometrically saturated' and`geometrically conservative' imply that T is maximal amongst geometrically conservative extensions of T; that is, any proper extension of it will prove geometric axioms not derivable from T. However, this property does not su ce to characterize T; see 6.2 below.
Finally in this section, we consider what can be said about the rst-order theory of a topos which is given to be of the form Sh(Syn fo (T);J ) for some rst-order theory Tin L ! ( ). In this case, we may again translate conditions (6) and (7) into rst-order sentences in L ! ( ) for su ciently large , and thus we obtain: Proof Let be the cardinality of the set of morphisms of Syn fo (T). Then it is clear that any closed sieve on an object of this category can be generated by at most morphisms, and that there are at most 2 closed sieves on any such object. Thus the index set of the conjunction appearing in (6) has cardinality at most 2 , and the disjunctions in both this condition and (7) are indexed by sets of cardinality at most . So, if we take to be (2 ) + , and take T to consist of all L sentences satis ed by y(U T ), it will certainly include all instances of these two conditions. Thus we see that, given a T-model M in F , the geometric morphism f : F ! Sh(Syn fo (T)) which corresponds to it under (5) will be open i M is actually a model of T. It follows that any L 1 sentence satis ed by y(U T ) is satis ed in all T-models in toposes, and hence (by the L 1 version of the completeness theorem) derivable from T; so the latter really is the full rst-order theory of y(U T ). The conservativity of Tover Tfollows from the fact, already noted in 3.3, that y(U T ) is an L -conservative model of T. And the nal assertion follows from the fact that every L 1 formula-in-context over , when interpreted in y(U T ), yields a subobject of some object of the site, which can be expressed as a closed sieve on that object and hence as the union of at most subobjects corresponding to L formulae. (The same argument shows that every -elementary morphism between models of T is 1-elementary, and hence justi es the subscript 1 on the right-hand side of the displayed equivalence in the statement of the Proposition.) Corollary 4.5 Let T be a rst-order theory. If, for some cardinal such that T is expressible in L , the theory T of Proposition 4.4 is equivalent to T, then T has a classifying topos in the sense de ned in the Introduction.
Proof If T is equivalent to T, then every T-model is classi ed by an open geometric morphism into Sh(Syn fo (T)) (that is, the image of (5) consists
precisely of the open geometric morphisms); also, the argument at the end of the proof of 4.4 shows that every -elementary morphism of T-models is 1-elementary. So we may take Sh(Syn fo (T)) to be B fo (T).
The criterion provided by 4.5 for existence of B fo (T) is not a very practical one, since it is in general very hard even to determine the axioms of T, let alone to determine whether they are derivable from those of T. In the next section, we shall provide a criterion (local smallness) which at least has the appearance of being more manageable, and which incidentally enables us to show that the converse of 4.5 is also true.
If T fails to satisfy the hypothesis of 4.5, it is still of interest to consider what can be said about the relationships between the toposes Sh(Syn fo (T)) for di erent values of . For the moment, let us x a pair of regular cardinals < such that T is expressible in L . The inclusion functor Syn fo (T) ! Syn fo (T) is clearly a -Heyting functor, and hence continuous (i.e. coverpreserving) when these two categories are equipped with the topologies J and J respectively; so it induces a geometric morphism Sh(Syn fo (T);J ) r -Sh(Syn fo (T);J ) whose inverse image sends the minimal T-model in Sh(Syn fo (T)) to that in Sh(Syn fo (T)).
Moreover, it is easy to see that the diagram T-Mod(F) -Top (F; Sh(Syn fo (T)))
T-Mod(F)
? -Top (F; Sh(Syn fo (T))) ? (8) (where the left vertical arrow is the inclusion, the right vertical arrow is induced by composition with r , and the horizontal arrows are instances of (5)) commutes up to natural isomorphism for any F , since both ways round send a T-model in F to the geometric morphism induced by the -Heyting functor Syn fo (T) ! F which corresponds to it. Taking F = Sh(Syn fo (T)), we see that the geometric morphism i : Sh(Syn fo (T)) ! Sh(Syn fo (T)) which corresponds to the minimal T-model in Sh(Syn fo (T)) satis es r i = 1; that is, Sh(Syn fo (T)) is a retract of Sh(Syn fo (T)). However, composition with i does not in general induce a commutative diagram similar to (8) . (ii) For all > , the geometric morphisms r and i de ned above are equivalences.
(iii) For all > , the morphism r is open.
Proof (i) ) (iii) by the de nition of B fo (T). is a -Heyting functor, where the rst factor corresponds to the minimal T-model in Sh(Syn fo (T)); and the composite clearly corresponds to the minimal T-model in Sh(Syn fo (T)). It follows that the composite i r is isomorphic to the identity; so r and i are inverse equivalences in Top. (ii) ) (i): If (ii) holds, then the minimal T-model in Sh(Syn fo (T)) is an Given a theory T which has no classifying topos (cf. 6.6 below), we can therefore expect the sequence of toposes Sh(Syn fo (T)) to`grow unboundedly' with the cardinal . It is tempting to speculate that it might be possible to embed Top in some larger 2-category in which one could compute thè limit as ! 1' of these toposes, and hence obtain an object which might support a truly generic T-model, even in the cases when the sequence does not stabilize' for su ciently large . But we shall not pursue these speculations here.
5 Locally small theories De nition 5.1 Let T be an in nitary rst-order theory over a signature
. We say T is locally small in a contextx if there is a set Sx of formulae in the contextx, such that every L 1 formula in this context is T-provably equivalent to a member of Sx. We say T is locally small if it is locally small in every context over .
Note that Tis locally small i there exists a cardinal such that every L 1 formula-in-context over is T-provably equivalent to an L formula. Note also that any geometrically saturated theory, as de ned after 4.2, is locally small, by the canonical form theorem for geometric formulae. Conversely, we have:
Lemma 5.2 Let T be a locally small theory over a signature . Then there exists a signature 0 extending , and a geometrically saturated theory T 0 over 0 , such that T 0 is`Morita-equivalent' to T in the sense that for every topos F we have an equivalence T-Mod(F) 1 ' T 0 -Mod(F) 1 ; and these equivalences are natural with respect to open geometric morphisms.
Proof We use (a version of) the technique known to model-theorists as
Morleyization': we extend the signature by adding, for each contextx and each member of Sx, a new relation symbol R Ã (whereÃ is the type ofx). For the axioms of T 0 , we take those of T together with all sentences of the form (8x)(R (x), ) :
A straightforward induction then shows that every formula-in-context over 0 is T 0 -provably equivalent to a formula over , and hence to an atomic formula over 0 , so T 0 is geometrically saturated (indeed`atomically saturated'). On the other hand, given any T-model M in a topos F , there is a unique way of interpreting the additional primitive symbols of 0 which makes M into a T 0model, and similar remarks apply to 1-elementary morphisms between such models; so we have the required equivalence T-Mod(F) 1 ' T 0 -Mod(F) 1 .
We are now ready for our main theorem: Proof (i) ) (ii) is Lemma 5.2.
(ii) ) (iii): It is clear that, if two theories are Morita-equivalent in the sense of 5.2, then one has a rst-order classifying topos i the other does; so we may as well assume that Titself is geometrically saturated. But, for a geometrically saturated theory T, the inclusion functor Syn g 1 (T g ) ! Syn fo 1 (T) is an equivalence, where T g denotes the geometric part of T, i.e. the set of all geometric axioms (strictly, of -geometric axioms for a su ciently large ) derivable from T. In particular, for such a , the inclusions Syn fo (T) ! Syn fo (T) are equivalences for all > (since both categories are equivalent to Syn g (T g )); so condition (ii) of 4.6 is trivially satis ed. (Ã) ), whereÃ is the type ofx; hence it is a set. Note that it would be possible to give a direct proof of (i) ) (iii) by exploiting the fact that, for a locally small theory T, the inclusion Syn fo (T) ! Syn fo 1 (T) is an equivalence for su ciently large . However, the detour via geometrically saturated theories is of interest in its own right (cf. Example 6.3 below). Another bene t of the detour is the following corollary, promised in the last section: Proof We saw after 4.3 that the full rst-order theory T of the generic Tmodel has these two properties. Conversely, suppose Sis any extension of T with these properties. Then Sis locally small, and so has a classifying topos B fo (S); and by the proof of (ii) ) (iii) in 5.3 we see that in fact B fo (S) ' B g (S g ), and that this equivalence identi es the generic model of Swith the generic model of S g . But S g is equivalent to T by conservativity; so all the sentences in T must be derivable from S, and conversely. 6 Examples and applications Example 6.1 If T is a propositional theory (that is, if the signature has no sorts|so that the only primitive symbols are propositions, and the only context is the empty one), then the syntactic category Syn fo 1 (T) is simply the complete Heyting algebra generated by the primitive propositions, modulo the lter generated by the propositions in T. Provided this algebra is small, the classifying topos B fo (T) is simply the topos of sheaves on it (for its canonical topology). For example, it is well known that the free complete Heyting algebra on one generator (unlike that on two generators, as previously mentioned) is a set: it has just one more element than the free Heyting algebra H on one generator, which is pictured on page 35 of 10] (the extra element comes immediately below the top element of H, and is the supremum of all the other elements of H). Equivalently, we may describe the free complete Heyting algebra as the algebra of ideals of H (since all but one of these ideals are principal); so if Tis the empty theory over the propositional signature with a single primitive proposition, we may identify B fo (T) with the topos of sheaves on H for the nite cover topology. (Note, incidentally, that this particular T is not itself geometrically saturated.) Example 6.2 If we consider the empty theory on one propositional generator p as a geometric theory, then its classifying topos B g (T) is well known to be the Sierpi nski topos 2;Set] (cf. Example 2.1), or equivalently the topos of sheaves on the Sierpi nski space S= f0; 1g with just one open point. It is easy to see that the full rst-order theory of this topos is axiomatized by the single proposition ::p; geometrically, this corresponds to the fact that a continuous map X ! S is open i the corresponding open subset of X is dense. From the explicit description of the free complete Heyting algebra on one generator mentioned in the previous example, it may be seen that T has just two maximal geometrically conservative extensions; one is axiomatized by ::p and the other by (p _ :p). But the latter is not geometrically saturated, since :p is not provably equivalent to a geometric formula. Example 6.3 Let Tbe a geometric theory whose geometric classifying topos B g (T) is Boolean. Since every geometric morphism into a Boolean topos is open ( 9], 3.5), it follows easily that B fo (T) (exists and) coincides with B g (T). Conversely, if a geometric theory T is equivalent to its geometrically saturated extension T, as de ned in 4.3, then every geometric morphism into B g (T) is open, and so the latter must be Boolean. (Thus the phenomenon rst observed by Kock 14] , that the generic model of a geometric theory may satisfy rst-order sentences not derivable from that theory, is typical of all such theories having non-Boolean classifying toposes.)
We recall that in 1] Blass and Scedrov characterized those coherent (that is, !-geometric) theories whose classifying toposes are Boolean: their characterization involved the conjunction of two conditions, of which the rst was a niteness condition and the second was (the nitary version of) what we have called`geometric saturatedness'. (Actually, in de ning the latter, they used a notion of`T-provable equivalence' relative to a classical logical calculus, rather than the (much more restrictive) constructive provable equivalence which we require. However, if it is already known that B g (T) is Boolean, then the two notions of equivalence agree, since each is equivalent to saying that the interpretations of two formulae-in-context coincide in the generic model.) Examples of such theories include the theories of in nite decidable sets, and of dense (trichotomous) linear orderings without endpoints. Example 6.4 As an example of the explicit computation of the full rstorder theory of the generic model of a geometric theory, we consider the theory O of objects: that is, the empty theory over the single-sorted signature with no primitive symbols except equality. It is well known ( 8] 
for each n > 0. (We can think of the rst two sentences as saying that G O is`not not a singleton', and of (9) as saying that it is`not not in nite'. Note also that the second axiom may be considered as the case n = 0 of (9).)
Many years ago, the second author conjectured that the above sentences might su ce to axiomatize the full rst-order theory of G O ; but at the time he lacked any means of verifying or disproving this conjecture. With the machinery provided by section 1 of this paper, we are now able to show that the conjecture is false, but that it is in a sense`very close to the truth'. In the rst place, we note that since any monomorphism with nonempty domain in Set f is split, a cosieve on a nonempty object of Set f is determined by the epimorphisms which it contains; and since there are (up to isomorphism) only nitely many epimorphisms with a given domain in Set f , it follows that the subobject lattice of each representable functor Set f ! Set is nite.
(In the notation introduced before 4.2, we can take the cardinal to be !.)
In particular, in determining what it means for a at functor Set op f ! F
to induce an open geometric morphism, we do not have to worry about condition (1) of 1.2, on in nite intersections of subobjects; all the work is done by condition (2), on universal quanti cation. Further, since Set f is generated as a category by the surjections (n + 1) ! n which identify a single pair of elements and the injections n ! (n + 1) which add a single new element, it su ces to consider condition (2) for morphisms of these two forms.
Of course, given an object A of a topos F , the corresponding at functor F : Set op f ! F is simply the functor n 7 ! A n ; equivalently, it sends n to the interpretation >(x 1 ; : : : ; x n )] A . A cosieve R on n in Set f , as we observed above, is generated by a nite set of surjections with domain n: each of these is in turn speci ed by a nite list of pairs of elements of n to be identi ed, and so we can think of R as the interpretation in G O of a nite disjunction of nite conjunctions of equations (x i = x j ); that is, of a positive quanti er-free formula in the context (x 1 ; : : :; x n ). Now let : n + 1 ! n be the surjection which identi es the last two elements of n + 1, and suppose given a cosieve R on n, corresponding to a positive quanti er-free formula . The cosieve 8 (R) on n + 1 consists of all those morphisms n + 1 ! p whose pushouts along lie in R; but we may restrict our attention to surjections, which correspond to nite conjunctions of equations in (x 1 ; : : :; x n ; x n+1 ), and the condition for such a conjunction to determine a morphism in 8 (R) is simply that (8x 1 ; : : : ; x n+1 )(( ^(x n = x n+1 ))) ) (10) should be provable. On the other hand, if F : Set op f ! F corresponds to an object A of F , then 8 F( ) (F(R)) is the largest subobject of A n+1 whose intersection with F( ): A n A n+1 is contained in F(R); that is, it is the interpretation in A of the formula ((x n = x n+1 )) ). So in this case condition (2) becomes the validity in A of the sentence (8x 1 ; : : :; x n+1 ) ((x n = x n+1 )) )) _ ; (11) where the disjunction on the right is over all nite conjunctions of atomic formulae satisfying (10) . However, since does not involve x n+1 , from ((x n = x n+1 ) ) ) we may deduce ((x n = x n ) ) ) by substitution, and provided actually involves a variable this reduces to ; so (11) is automatically satis ed except possibly in the cases when is either > or ?. For = > it is again automatic; and for = ? it simply reduces to (8x 1 ; : : :; x n+1 )(((x n = x n+1 ) ) ?) ) ?), which is (essentially) the rst of the three sentences listed above.
For the injections n ! n + 1, it is necessary to consider the case n = 0 separately, and we deal with this rst. There are only two cosieves on 1 in Set f , and the validity of (2) for the top one is again automatic, so we need only consider the empty cosieve. The universal quanti cation of this cosieve along 0 ! 1 is again empty, whereas if we perform the quanti cation in F we obtain (8x)?] A = :(9x)>] A , so the condition we obtain is simply the sentence ::(9x)>.
Finally, consider the inclusion : n ! n + 1 (n > 0) and a cosieve R on n + 1, corresponding to a positive quanti er-free formula in (x 1 ; : : :; x n+1 ). We nd that a surjection from n, corresponding to a conjunction of atomic formulae in (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), belongs to 8 (R) i (8x 1 ; : : : ; x n+1 )( ) ) is provable. So condition (2) in this case becomes the sentence (8x 1 ; : : : ; x n )((8x n+1 ) ) _ ); where the disjunction is over all as above. If itself does not mention x n+1 , this is trivially satis ed; if it does, then from we may deduce ( W n i=1 (x n+1 = x i ) _ 0 ), where 0 is the disjunction of all those conjunctions of equations in that do not mention x n+1 . So the condition we require is (8x 1 ; : : :; x n ) (8x n+1 ) n _ i=1 (x n+1 = x i ) _ ) ; (12) where is any positive quanti er-free formula in (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ). Of course, (9) is just the special case of this when = ?; conversely, we could deduce (12) from (9) if we had the (constructively invalid)`dual Frobenius rule' that (8x)( _ ) entails ((8x) _ ) provided x is not free in . Thus our axiomatization of the full rst-order theory of G O is exactly that conjectured above, except for the replacement of the scheme (9) by the stronger (12) .
We remark that (12) is a genuine strengthening of (9). Let F = N;Set] where N is the ordered set of natural numbers; thus objects of F are diagrams of the form A(0) 0 -A(1) 1 -A(2) -:
Let A be the object de ned by A(i) = f0; 1g for all i, and i (0) = i (1) = 0 for all i. Then A satis es (9) (as well as the other two conditions in our axiomatization), but fails to satisfy (12) for n = 2 with taken to be (x 1 = x 2 ). Note also that the classifying map F ! B g (O) of A is induced by a functor N ! Set f (namely A itself!); it may be veri ed that this functor satis es (the dual of) condition (a) of ( 9], 2.5) but not condition (b) or (c), and so the classifying map of A is sub-open but not open. On the other hand, if we modify A by taking each A(i) to be a three-element set, then its classifying map is not even sub-open.
Similar techniques may be used to axiomatize the full rst-order theories of other familiar toposes such as the topos of simplicial sets. Example 6.5 In 17] , Moerdijk and Palmgren construct a topos containing a minimal model of Heyting arithmetic (HA). It is easy to see that their construction is exactly that of the topos Sh(Syn fo ! (HA)), together with the minimal model y(U HA ). On the other hand, the minimal model which they construct for the theory HAI (Heyting arithmetic extended by an external induction scheme for standard natural numbers and an overspill principle), is not simply y(U HAI ), since it is not conservative (see 17], 4.10). Example 6.6 The fact (already mentioned in the Introduction) that the free complete Heyting algebra on two generators is a proper class 11] enables us to show that`most' familiar theories are not locally small. Given a theory T and a contextx, let us say that two formulae and in the contextx form a free pair if, given any topos E and any two subobjects U; V of the terminal object of E , we can nd a T-model M in E , together with an assignment of elements c i : 1 ! MA i to the variables x i inx, such that the interpretations (c)] M and (c)] M are U and V respectively. (For example, if T is the theory of objects (as in 6.4), then the formulae (x = y) and (y = z) are a free pair in the context (x; y; z), since we can take M to be the colimit of the diagram 1 U --1 V --1 ;
with the obvious assignment of values to the three variables. The same pair of formulae will be free for any (single-sorted) theory T with the property that any object of a topos can occur as a subobject of the underlying object of a T-model.) If T has a free pair of formulae in the contextx, then it cannot be locally small in that context, since by taking E = Sh(H ) (where H is a two-generator complete Heyting algebra of cardinality at least , as in the Introduction) and taking U and V to be the generators of H , we see that the propositional combinations of the free pair of formulae will yield at least inequivalent formulae in the contextx.
